Introduction
The economic literature on inter vivos transfers has so far focused on questions such as "What motivates the transfers?" (e.g. Becker, 1974; Lucas and Stark, 1985; Cox, 1987; Townsend, 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001) , "Do public transfers crowd them out?" (e.g. Cox and Jakubson, 1995; Cox et al., 1998; Albarran and Attanasio, 2003; Jensen, 2004) , and "How do they a¤ect the recipients?" (e.g. Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Yang, 2008; Calero et al., 2009; Acosta, 2011; Alcaraz et al., 2012) . Needless to say, these questions are crucial to better our understanding of the workings of private transfers. In this paper, however, I ask a di¤erent question that complements the existing studies, namely, "How do interhousehold transfers in ‡uence resource allocation in the sender household?". 1 In particular, I examine human capital investment among children in transferrer households where their parents are the senders, using household survey data from Vietnam. To the best of my knowledge, this is the …rst study of the impact of interhousehold transfers on sender households. Why is it important to investigate the impact of interhousehold transfers on the senders? First, the impact of the transfers should be evaluated on both recipients and senders, not just the former. Existing studies have concentrated on the e¤ects on the recipients, and most of them have found that private transfers-more speci…cally, remittances-are bene…cial to the recipients. For example, Alcaraz et al. (2012) examine how remittances from the United States have a¤ected children in the recipient households in Mexico. They …nd that the private transfers reduce their labor supply and improve their school attendance. Yang (2008) also …nds the same in Philippine data: he additionally …nds that remittances encourage capital-intensive business activities by the recipient households.
2 However, the e¤ects on the other side of private transfers, i.e. the senders, have so far been ignored. Without …lling this gap in our knowledge, we are unable to assess the overall impact of private transfers. Second, existing studies have found that public transfers partially crowd out private transfers.
3 For example, Jensen (2004) …nds that, in South Africa, an increase in public pension to the elderly by one rand has resulted in a reduction in private transfers from 1 In this paper, the term "household" refers to the unit formed by coresiding individuals who are related by blood or marriage.
2 According to the recent migration literature, positive e¤ects of remittances on the households left behind are more than o¤set by negative e¤ects of the absence of migrated household members, particularly during the period immediately after the migration: See Antman (2011) and Gibson et al. (2011) . 3 An exception is Cox and Jakubson (1995) who provide some evidence that public transfers may have increased private transfers in the United States.
their children by about a quarter of a rand. Albarran and Attanasio (2003) also …nd partial crowding-out in Mexico: they provide some evidence that this partial crowding-out is due to the imperfect enforceability of informal risk-sharing contracts. Based on these …ndings, private transfers may appear more e¢ cient and attractive than public transfers, since public income redistribution is administratively costlier than private transfers and hence potentially reduces the size of the pie available for redistribution. Private transfers also target recipients more precisely than public transfers. However, if private transfers had negative e¤ects on the senders and public transfers were able to reduce or remove some of these adverse e¤ects, the cost of conducting public transfers might be worth paying.
This study examines human capital investment among children in households where their parents are the senders of private interhousehold transfers. As mentioned above, human capital investment is an outcome variable that existing studies have frequently used in evaluating the impact of private transfers on the recipients in developing countries. Therefore, it is natural to study this outcome variable so that we can compare the impact on the senders with that on the receivers. To sketch causal channels from private transfers to human capital investment, I employ a simple Beckerian model of noncooperative altruistic agents in two households: a parent and the child in one household, and a relative living elsewhere. The model yields the hypothesis that parents'spending for child education decreases when they increase transfers to relatives who su¤er from a negative income shock. I then test this prediction using Vietnamese household panel data collected during the 1990s when the country experienced a rapid economic growth. Vietnam during this period is suitable for this study because inter vivos transfers between households took place very commonly in the country (Cox, 2004) .
The challenge for empirically investigating the impact of interhousehold transfers on household resource allocation is how to deal with the problems of simultaneity and reverse causality that are common to many applied econometric studies. The …rst problem is that if interhousehold transfers and human capital investment are determined simultaneously by some third factor, there is no causality between the two, and any correlation we may …nd between the two is spurious. The second problem is that any correlation between the two may suggest the causality from human capital investment to the transfers, and not the other way round. In this paper, I obtain instrumented …rst-di¤erence estimates in order to deal with the potential endogeneity of interhousehold transfers.
The …rst two waves of the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (1992-1993 and 1997-1998) allow us to form the shortest panel of households with detailed information on individuals, enabling us to control for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity through …rst di¤erencing. This is useful for handling the likely simultaneity problem caused by …xed characteristics idiosyncratic to the child and his or her household. However, …rst di¤erencing does not solve the simultaneity problem generated by time-variant unobservable heterogeneity across observations. That is, the cross-wave changes in interhousehold transfers and human capital investment might both be driven by the corresponding change in some third factor that is speci…c to the child and/or his or her household. Moreover, …rst di¤erencing does not eliminate the possibility of reverse causality. Therefore, I instrument the cross-wave change in interhousehold transfers by the variables that directly a¤ect it but not the cross-wave change in household expenditures for child education: the latter is a¤ected only indirectly via the change in the private transfers. The instruments are constructed by using information on relatives living elsewhere. Based on the literature on informal risk-sharing and consumption smoothing (e.g. Townsend, 1994; Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997; Ligon et al., 2002; Lund, 2003, Attanasio and Ríos-Rull, 2003) , I reason that the households that had relatives living in provinces severely hit by a natural disaster must have exogenously increased outgoing transfers to provide them with assistance.
Empirical evidence indicates with 99% con…dence that an increase in the net transfer by one million Vietnamese dong 4 reduces the total household expenditure on the education of each child by at least 10 percent. 5 A less conservative estimate at the 95% con…dence level is a fall by at least 34 percent. These estimates suggest an adverse e¤ect of interhousehold transfers on children within sender households. In the next section, I present a conceptual framework and derive a hypothesis. Section 3 presents econometric analysis. Section 4 concludes.
Conceptual framework
In this section, I provide a simple conceptual framework for the relationship between interhousehold transfers and human capital investment in a household. In the following model à la Becker (1974) , private transfers are motivated by altruistic preferences. Of course, this is not the only motivation for private transfers. For example, as Cox (1987: 518-519) has shown, exchange motives can also induce private transfers. In fact, in many situations, private transfers seem motivated by a combination of di¤erent factors. This study is not intended to distinguish between transfers based on altruism and other reasons, and I do not suggest that the hypothesis derived below is unique to transfers based on altruistic preferences.
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Consider three agents, denoted by i = fp; c; rg for Parent, Child, and Relative, respectively. Parent and Child live together to form a household, while Relative lives elsewhere to form another household. Agent i gains a utility x i (q i ; k) from i's consumption of the amount q i of multi-purpose goods and Parent's investment in Child's human capital, k.
The goods and human capital investment are both normal, i.e. @x i =@q i ; @x i =@k > 0. The utility functions are well behaved, i.e.
and by Young's theorem 
Utilities
Suppose that the agents care about each other in their own ways. Parent's total utility is given by
where p j 2 (0; 1) with j = fp; c; rg and j p j = 1 are Parent's caring weights. p p is the weight given to the subutility from the own consumption of goods and investment in Child's human capital, x p ( ), whereas p j with j 6 = p is the weight given to agent j's total utility, v j ( ). 7 Similarly, Child's total utility is
and Relative's is
The three agents are thus assumed to care about each other's total utility. 8 These three equations can be rewritten such that they care about each other's subutilities as follows: 
Constraints
The resource constraint for the household where Parent and Child coreside is
where y p 0 is the household's pre-transfer income, ij 0 transfers from i to j, and y p 0 the post-transfer income. It is assumed that interhousehold transfers are sent 7 In this simple presentation, I treat the caring weights as exogenous, but more generally they may be functions of prices and income, e.g. Browning and Chiappori (1998) . 8 This formulation allows for example the case where Parent may want Child to consume a larger share of the household budget net of the transfer to Relative, i.e. See Bergstrom (1989: Puzzle 1) . 9 The derivation is given in Appendix A.
6 from/to Parent. 10 The unit price of multi-purpose goods is normalized to one. The resource constraint for Relative is
These two resource constraints hold at equality by assuming non-satiation.
Order of events
The two adults, Parent and Relative, play a noncooperative game. I assume that Child does not make any decision. The order of events in each period is as follows: 
Intrahousehold income allocation
At the last stage of the game, Parent decides on the allocation of disposable income within his household by solving
10 In the data I analyze below, the estimation sample of children did not send interhousehold transfers even though I do not condition on the incidence of sending transfers. Furthermore, the number of children who received interhousehold transfers is small. Approximately 98 percent of the senders were the household heads or their spouses in the whole sample. The assumption re ‡ects this feature of the data. Proof. See Appendix B.
Interhousehold transfers
At the second last stage of the game, the two adults simultaneously and noncooperatively decide on interhousehold transfers to each other, given the total income available to the two households and taking into account that Parent can decide on the allocation of his household's post-transfer income at the …nal stage. Proof. This is simply because a change in y r a¤ects the size of the pie to share, Y , but not the optimal rule for dividing the pie between the two households.
Equilibrium transfers
Each adult can decide only on the amount of outward transfers: incoming transfers are under the control of the other adult. Equilibrium transfers, ( pr 0; rp 0), depend on caring parameters as well as pre-transfer income relative to most preferred quantities. Each player makes a positive transfer only if his household's pre-transfer income is greater than his ideal post-transfer income for the household. Appendix C lists all possibilities, and the equilibrium transfer pair is one of them. The following lemma applies to any equilibrium pair. The fall in y r increases pr .
Thus, a su¢ ciently large negative shock to Relative's income is likely to increase Parent's net transfers to Relative. This will in turn reduces Parent's household's post-transfer income available for goods consumption and human capital investment. Accordingly, by Lemma 1, Parent's spending for Child's human capital accumulation falls.
Hypothesis A su¢ ciently large fall in Relative's pre-transfer income induces an increase in the net transfer from Parent, which in turn decreases Parent's spending for educating Child.
Empirical analysis
The challenges for empirically investigating the impact of private interhousehold transfers on resource allocation within sender households are the problems of simultaneity and reverse causality that are common to many applied econometric studies. The simultaneity problem addresses the issue that household resource allocation decisions, including interhousehold transfers, may be jointly determined at the household level by some third factor, making the transfers an endogenous regressor. The possibility of reverse causality exists in this study, as educational spending could cause interhousehold transfers by reducing the household budget available for outward transfers. This is not a problem if the human capital investment decision were made for planned or anticipated transfers because the educational spending decision would then be made in response to the transfers despite the fact that the transfers would take place after educational expenditures.
11 But the human capital investment decision could be made regardless of future transfers, in which case reverse causality exists if educational spending is negatively correlated to interhousehold transfers. In this study, I will attempt to deal with these endogeneity problems by instrumented …rst-di¤erence estimation that takes into account both time-invariant and time-variant unobservable heterogeneity.
Data
I analyze data collected by the …rst two waves of the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) to test the hypothesis that household expenditures on the education of each child at home decrease when the parents increase outward interhousehold transfers. The …rst wave surveyed 4,800 households in the country between September 1992 and October 1993. The sampling design was self-weighted, i.e. each household had the same probability of being included in the sample. 80 percent of the sample were in rural areas, and the rest in urban areas. Out of these nationally representative households, the second wave could reinterview 4,305 between December 1997 and December 1998.
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I use a subsample of the reinterviewed households. In particular, I concentrate on families with the same household head in both waves so that …rst di¤erencing can cleanly remove time-invariant unobservable characteristics of the household head.
13 I then fur-11 Unfortunately, as Cox and Fafchamps (2008: 3736) have pointed out, most surveys including the one I examine in this paper focus on realized, instead of potential, transfers.
12 Out of the 495 non-resurveyd households, 96 were in 3 Red River Delta communes that were dropped due to the second wave sampling design. 281 households had moved out of their communes since the …rst interview, 19 were temporarily away from their communes, 1 was dissolved, 12 refused to be reinterviewed, and the rest weren't reinterviewed for an unknown reason. The World Bank (2000; gives more detailed information on these two VLSS waves. 13 Most households in the data set had the same head in both waves, and approximately 4 percent of the resurveyed sample are lost by this conditioning. Note that the same head in both interviews does not necessarily deny the possibility that the head was a di¤erent person for a period in between the two ther restrict the sample to families where household members other than the head and the head's spouse did not send any transfer to a non-member. This ensures that an interhousehold transferrer is either the head or the spouse, or both, and no one else in households I study.
14 I then drop households where the heads are 70 years old or older.
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A few polygamous households are also dropped. From the remaining households, I take the head's children whose ages fall in the range from 7 up to 18 years at both interviews.
16
There are 2,731 such individuals in 1,714 households.
[Insert Table 1 here] Table 1 presents the means of variables for analysis by the household's cross-wavechange-in-the-net-transfer status. 17 The …rst variable listed in the table is the outcome variable of interest-the cross-wave change in the total household spending for the education of the child. 18 The spending information in each wave refers to the 12-month period prior to the interview. The reference period is long and hence the collected information is likely to be noisy, but this is the only period that corresponds to the available information on private interhousehold transfers in the data set. The educational expenditure is in thousands of Vietnamese dong. This variable (and all other variables that are expressed in monetary terms in this study) is adjusted to both temporal and spatial price level di¤erences and are expressed at the January 1993 national average price level. On average, the educational spending increased across the waves. Clearly, the average increase is larger among children whose households also increased the net transfer across the waves (24 percent of the estimation sample children): 54 percent larger than the interviews. The use of …rst di¤erencing implicitly assumes that the head did not change across the two waves. 14 This restriction does not drop many households because approximately 98 percent of interhousehold transferrers are the household heads and their spouses in the data. 15 Since Cox (2004) shows strong associations between retirement and incoming transfers in this Vietnamese data set, I removed these households with elderly heads even though they had a young child of their own at home. Naturally, there are not many elderly heads who had a young child of their own. Dropping households where the heads are 65 years old or older gives similar results. 16 As a result, the examined children were 7 to 13 years old at the …rst interview. 17 For interested readers, I also present cross-sectional summary statistics in Table A1 . Note that, since I describe the data as two cross sections (one for each wave) in that table, I use the head's children whose ages are in the range from 7 up to 18 in at least one wave instead of those who fall in this age range at both interviews. Accordingly, a child in Table A1 was not necessarily interviewed in both waves. Also, the household head was not necessarily the same in both waves. 18 The total expenditure includes tuition and registration fees, contributions to parents' associations and schools, purchases of textbooks, stationery goods, school uniforms, transport fees, lunch expenses, and other study-related expenses (Section 2 of the survey questionnaire).
increase among the rest of the estimation sample children. The uncontrolled correlation between the cross-wave changes in the net transfer and educational spending is positive. According to the World Bank, 19 the gross national income per capita was 2,268,708 dong in 1993. Hence a child in a household with a cross-wave increase in the net transfer received approximately 11 percent of the GNI per capita for his/her education, whereas a child in a household without a transfer increase received about 7 percent of it. The explanatory variable of interest is the cross-wave change in the net transfer from the household: the …rst item in the list of controlled variables at the household level. It is given in millions of dong. In this study, the net interhousehold transfer measure includes both gifts and informal loans. As Cox and Fafchamps (2008: 3735) have noted, what a household calls a gift may in fact be given in expectation of some future reciprocal help, and also what it calls a loan can contain an element of gift if it is given interest free without a strict repayment deadline. Therefore, although the data enable us to distinguish between gifts and informal loans, I do not separate them in this paper.
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The average cross-wave increase among households that increased the net transfer is 1.12 million dong, and the average change among the rest of the households is minus 480,000 dong.
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I control for other characteristics at both individual and household levels. At the individual level, I control for the child's sex, age, health status, the number of household members older than him/her but below 70, and the number of members younger than him/her. Obviously, the cross-wave change in age does not di¤er much across individuals, and hence I do not control for that. However, I control for the initial, i.e. …rst-wave, age because educational expenditures are likely to be dependent on the level of schooling which is positively correlated to age. In constructing the cross-wave change in the health status, I categorize the child as unhealthy if he/she was so ill that his/her anthropometric information could not be collected when the surveyor visited the household. It is unclear a priori whether and how educational spending di¤ers between healthy and unhealthy children. The cross-wave change in the number of coresiding members who are younger than the child, and also working age members older than him/her, is included to capture the change in the child's position in the household. Table 1 indicates that the average number of younger members (mostly younger siblings) increased across the waves, but 19 See the notes for Table 1 . 20 Removing informal loans from the transfer measure does not change the results. Estimates using the net gift transfer are available from the author upon request. 21 There are 604 children (29% of 2,069) whose households reduced the net transfer across the waves. The average decrease among them is minus 1.65 million dong. 13 the increase was smaller among households with a positive cross-wave change in the net transfer.
The rest of the explanatory variables relate to the household and its head. In addition to the numbers of older working-age household members and younger members (which di¤er across individuals), I control for three other household-composition variables. One is the cross-wave change in the number of household members aged 70 or above, and the other two relate to the existence of the head's spouse. The …rst one is a measure of the number of dependants at home, additional to the number of household members younger than the child in question. The other two variables indicate that heads with a cross-wave increase in the net transfer were slightly less likely to have a spouse initially, and have room to get a spouse by the second survey.
Since parents are still likely to exert strong in ‡uence over children in the age range that I study, I control for more of the household head's (i.e. one of the child's parent's) characteristics than the existence of a spouse: sex, age, ethnicity, religion, and health status. I also control for the head's highest educational quali…cation attained. I use the head's education instead of taking either the average or the max of educational attainment among the parents, assuming that the head makes the …nal decisions in the household. The head's highest educational quali…cation is the information from the …rst interview because this variable does not change after the …rst wave in most households. The head's age is also the information from the …rst survey because the cross-wave changes in age do not di¤er much across individuals. The average head age is approximately 40 years in the …rst survey. Household heads with a cross-wave increase in the net transfer are slightly less likely to be male than the other heads, and also slightly less likely to belong to ethnic minority. They are more educated on average. I attempt to control for both initial level and cross-wave change in the household wealth by using the …rst-wave value of dwelling, the …rst-wave value of durable goods, and the cross-wave change in the value of durable goods. 22 The dwelling value refers to the value at the time of interview. Unfortunately, there are many missing observations on this information in the second wave. Hence I use only the …rst-wave value. The value of durable goods is a preferred measure of household wealth because information on the purchase date of each item is available. I compute the total present value of durable goods purchased by household members more than 12 months ago. 23 Thus, the purchase 22 The VLSS information on household savings is not suitable for capturing wealth in this study because it is the amount at the time of interview. Thus, the information on private transfers precedes that on savings. 23 The durable goods include TV, video player/recorder, stereo, radio, computer, camera, fridge/freezer, 14 timing suggests that it refers to household wealth determined before both interhousehold transfers and educational expenditures. Table 1 shows that households with increased net transfers are initially wealthier than the rest of the households. It also shows that all households increased wealth on average, but households with increased net transfers increased it more than the remaining households. The household's status of having a farm or nonfarm business is also controlled for. Households with increased net transfers are initially slightly less likely to manage agricultural activities than the other households. Still over 80 percent of households managed such activities, regardless of the net transfer status. The cross-wave change in selfmanaged agricultural activities indicates a general tendency to stop such activities. On the other hand, households are equally likely to self-manage non-agricultural business activities regardless of the net transfer status. Households with a cross-wave increase in the net transfer are slightly less likely to be located in rural areas.
Estimation
By exploiting the longitudinal nature of the …rst two VLSS waves, I control for timeinvariant unobservables at the individual level through …rst di¤erencing. Suppose households that are more altruistic tend to regard human capital investment more highly. As a result, households that transfer more also spend more on child education. Now suppose an exogenous event generates urgent need to assist relatives living elsewhere. Then, more altruistic households further increase outward transfers and as a result reduce educational spending. On the other hand, less altruistic households increase transfers little, if any, and as a result educational spending remains the same. Consequently, educational spending by more altruistic households gets closer to that by less altruistic households. In this case, other things equal, the di¤erence in educational spending across households becomes small, as the di¤erence in private transfers increases. Then, the cross-sectional IV estimation could underestimate the impact of private transfers on educational expenditures. 24 Therefore, it is important to control for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity. air conditioner, washing machine, water heater, gas/electric cooker, automobile, motorbike, boat, sewing machine, and furniture. The full list is in Section 12C of the survey questionnaire.
24 Table A2 presents the result from IV estimation of the cross-sectional version of the same speci…cation as for Table 3 (a). It seems to be consistent with my speculation. The estimated coe¢ cient on the net transfer is insigni…cant, but cross-sectional estimation cannot tell whether this is due to unobservable heterogeneity or not.
The estimated equation is
where y ij is the cross-wave change in the expenditure for the education of child i in household j, the cross-wave change in the intercept, x ij the vector of cross-wave changes in exogenous variables at the individual level, z j the vector of cross-wave changes in exogenous variables at the household level, x ij1 the vector of observables at the individual level in wave 1, z j1 the vector of observables at the household level in wave 1, and u ij the cross-wave change in the random error term. z j includes the explanatory variable of our interest, i.e. the cross-wave change in the net interhousehold transfer. x ij1 and z j1 include both time-variant and time-invariant variables. They include the sex and age of the child and the household head, the head's ethnicity, religion, and highest educational quali…cation attained, the existence of the head's spouse at home, whether the household self-manages agricultural activities, whether it self-manages non-agricultural business activities, the total value of the household's durable goods, and the value of its dwelling value. (See Table 1 .) In the case of time-variant variables, they control for the di¤erence in initial conditions across the panel of children. We can estimate (16) by OLS, provided that u ij is correlated with neither x ij , x ij1 , z j , nor z j1 . This assumption is satis…ed if u ijt for each wave t = 1; 2 is uncorrelated with x ijt and z jt for both waves.
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First di¤erencing enables us to control for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity at the individual and household levels. However, it does not control for unobservable time-variant heterogeneity that may determine both the change in the net interhousehold transfer and the change in the household expenditure for child education simultaneously. There also remains a concern with reverse causality. That is, outward transfers may be caused by a household budget increased by a fall in educational spending. Therefore, …rst-di¤erence estimates do not necessarily re ‡ect causality from the net transfer to educational expenditure. As I am interested in the impact of the net transfer on human capital investment, I attempt to deal with the potential endogeneity by instrumental variables that directly a¤ect the change in the net interhousehold transfer, but the change in educational spending is a¤ected by them only indirectly through a change in the household budget caused by the net-transfer change.
My instruments are based on information about relatives living elsewhere. From
December 1997 to June 1998, Vietnam su¤ered from one of the most acute droughts in history. The rainfall was 40 to 250 mm, accounting for only 5 to 20 percent of the average, and the temperature was between 35 and 42 Celsius. Approximately 3.8 million people lacked fresh water in the country, and many agricultural activities were disrupted. 26 The idea is that an unexpectedly acute drought would exogenously generate urgent need for interhousehold assistance from una¤ected or less severely a¤ected people to devastated victims-in particular, closely related victims. This would directly in ‡uence the transferrer's budget, which would in turn require a reallocation of resources within the sender household. The second wave of VLSS (Section 1D of the survey questionnaire) provides information on …rst-wave household members who left their households at some time between the …rst and second surveys and became a non-member in the second wave. This enables me to know who left why, where, and when after the …rst survey. For each household, I count the number of wave-1 member relatives who left the household before the beginning of the second survey to the regions that were severely a¤ected by the drought. Obviously, this count underestimates the number of relatives who lived in drought-hit regions. To supplement this underestimate, I also count second-wave household members' children who formed households in those drought-hit regions at the time of the second interview (Section 1C of the survey questionnaire). Note that most of those children are already adult, 27 and hence we can safely include them in the count. 28 In summary, my main instrument is the number of relatives living in communes severely a¤ected by the drought for the households that are not in those seriously a¤ected areas themselves.
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The instrumental variable is thus de…ned at the household level. It is important to exclude households that were located in a¤ected areas themselves because their educational expenditures are likely to be directly a¤ected by the natural disaster. Rural communes of Uplands, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, and Central Highlands are chosen as the particularly su¤ered areas, according to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002: 27) . In the analysis below, I will also try the indicator of the existence of such a relative 26 The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2002: 27) gives more detail. 27 Schooling children who lived elsewhere but were …nancially dependent are regarded as household members in the survey (Section 1A of the survey questionnaire). 28 Otherwise, outward transfers to those children may themselves be household expenditures for child education. 29 My count of relatives still underestimates the actual number, as we can easily imagine that there are other relatives living elsewhere who were neither household members at the time of the …rst survey nor children of household members. Unfortunately, I do not have su¢ cient information to identify all relatives living elsewhere.
as an alternative instrument.
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[Insert Figure 1 here] Approximately 4.5 percent of the estimation sample record a positive number of relatives in those drought-hit communes and were at the same time located outside the a¤ected area. Figure 1 presents the frequency distribution across the number of relatives. Approximately 31 percent of children in households that record a positive number of relatives also record a cross-wave increase in the net transfer, 24 percent a cross-wave decrease, and 45 percent no change. The OLS regression of the indicator version of the instrumental variable on the cross-wave change in the net transfer and a constant gives a statistically signi…cant positive correlation of .47 at 5 percent. Using the number, instead of existence, of relatives, the correlation is .12 statistically signi…cant at 10 percent. Table 2 presents the …rst result from using the existence, instead of the number, of relatives in drought-hit communes for households located outside those communes in order to instrument the cross-wave change in the net interhousehold transfer. I present 2SLS heteroskedasticity-robust estimates from both …rst-and second-stage estimation. The 30 As an alternative to the drought, I also constructed these IVs based on Typhoon Linda. On November 2, 1997, the southern tip of the country was hit by this typhoon at the wind speed of approximately 100 km per hour, the worst tropical storm to strike the area since 1904. Tens of thousands of people were left homeless, and almost 500,000 hectares of rice …elds were destroyed. The typhoon rapidly developed in the South China Sea (called the East Sea in Vietnam) on November 1. People did not have su¢ cient time to prepare for its strike, and certainly people outside the a¤ected area did not prepare a transfer in anticipation of such a powerful disaster. (IIED, 1997) The idea was inspired by Cox (2004: 596-597 ) who points out that this natural disaster occurred just one month before the second survey began. As severely a¤ected areas, I chose Tien Giang, Vinh Long, Kien Giang, Ca Mau, and Bac Lieu where 6,196 to 163,026 houses were reported to have been destroyed according to the United Nations Development Program (January 6, 1998, http://reliefweb.int/node/2403). Unfortunately, the number of houses in each province just before the typhoon is unknown, as the modern Vietnamese housing census after independence took place once a decade starting in 1979. Using data from the third census in April 1999 (although too much time had passed since the end of October 1997 at this census point), it seems that these …ve provinces had at least 10 percent of houses destroyed by the typhoon, while the other a¤ected provinces had much less houses destroyed. Of course, housing damage is not the only negative shock that could attract incoming transfers, but it seems a reasonable indicator for the extent of the overall negative shock. While the event ensures exogeneity, there are only a small number of households that were located outside the a¤ected area and at the same time had a relative inside it in my estimation sample. Therefore, I have judged that Typhoon Linda-based instruments are unfortunately unreliable in my study.
Results
educational spending is in natural logarithm in the main equation. Therefore, multiplying the coe¢ cient on the cross-wave change in the net interhousehold transfer by 100 gives a percentage change in household expenditure for child education caused by a million dong increase in the net transfer.
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Looking at the …rst-stage result, the excluded indicator instrument is signi…cant at 5 percent, suggesting that the net transfer from the household increases by 470,000 million dong. The size of the F -statistic for the instrument is often used as an indicator for the strength of the excluded instrument: the rule of thumb is that it is su¢ ciently strong if F > 10. Here, F is below 4 (shown toward the bottom of the table), implying that the correlation between the instrument and the cross-wave change in the net transfer is not su¢ ciently strong. The partial R 2 between these two is also very low and hence suggests the same. The tests of endogeneity indicate that the cross-wave change in the net transfer is indeed endogenous in the main equation. However, these tests are reliable only when the instrument is strong. Hence the test results are only suggestive. Turning to the main equation, the cross-wave change in the net transfer has a negative coe¢ cient. The 2SLS estimate of the marginal e¤ect is statistically insigni…cant. However, the estimate is biased toward OLS when the instrument is weak. The OLS estimate without instrumenting is shown at the bottom of the table. It is minus .02, and is statistically signi…cant at 5 percent. It suggests that an increase in the net transfer by one million dong reduces the educational expenditure by 2 percent. Since one million dong is a large amount (approximately 44% of GNI per capita), the impact appears economically insigni…cant. The 2SLS estimate of statistically insigni…cant minus 1.20 suggests that the OLS bias is upward. For inference with the weak instrument, Mikusheva and Poi's (2006) coverage-corrected p-value based on the conditional likelihood-ratio test is given below the 2SLS estimate. It indicates that the negative coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cant at less than 5 percent. However, it should be noted that their p-value is not heteroskedasticity-robust, and hence it is only suggestive.
[Insert Table 2 here] 31 I have also examined the impact of the net transfer on educational spending in levels instead of natural log, and the results are similar.
Existence of relatives outside drought-hit areas for households located inside those areas
In constructing our instrument, we have excluded households that were themselves located in drought-hit communes because educational spending is likely to be a¤ected directly by the drought in those households. However, Table 2 shows that, while households located in drought-hit communes decreased the net interhousehold transfer by 270,000 dong on average (statistically signi…cant at 5%), their educational expenditures did not di¤er ceteris paribus. This suggests that we may drop the indicator of being located in the a¤ected areas from the main equation, and utilize households located in a¤ected communes to construct an additional instrument. My additional instrument is the number of relatives outside drought-hit communes for households located in the a¤ected communes. Following the same reasoning as I used in constructing the number of relatives in drought-hit communes for households located outside the a¤ected communes, I expect that the net transfers from these households would fall because they reduce or stop outward transfers and increase inward transfers from their relatives. Clearly, a household cannot record a positive number in both instrumental variables. Approximately 3.6 percent of the estimation sample record a positive number of relatives outside drought-hit areas and were at the same time located inside the a¤ected areas. Figure 2 presents the frequency distribution across the number of relatives. The OLS regression of the indicator version of this instrumental variable on the cross-wave change in the net transfer and a constant gives a statistically signi…cant correlation of minus 1.01 at 5 percent. Using the number, instead of existence, of relatives, the correlation is minus .61 statistically signi…cant at 10 percent.
[Insert Figure 2 here] Panel (a) of Table 3 presents the LIML result from dropping the indicator of being located in the a¤ected areas from the main equation and adding the existence, instead of the number, of relatives outside drought-hit communes for households located in the a¤ected communes to the …rst-stage equation. The two excluded instruments are both signi…cant at 5 percent. The indicator of having at least one relative in drought-hit communes for households located outside those communes maintains a positive coe¢ cient. The newly added instrument has an expected negative sign. The estimate indicates that drought-a¤ected households with relatives outside the hit areas decrease the net interhousehold transfer by 870,000 dong on average. The F -statistic has increased to 4.40, but the correlation between the instruments and the cross-wave change in the net transfer is still not su¢ ciently strong. The partial R 2 also remains close to zero. The test of over-identifying restrictions seems to suggest that the just-identi…ed result in Table 2 is more reliable than the current result. The estimated coe¢ cient on the crosswave change in the net transfer in the main equation remains statistically insigni…cantly negative. Its magnitude is smaller than before, which is expected because the bias toward OLS increases as the number of instruments increases. Mikusheva and Poi's non-robust coverage-corrected p-value indicates that it is now insigni…cant at 5 percent.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Using the number of relatives
Since it is possible for households located outside drought-hit communes that the more relatives are a¤ected by the disaster the more transfers are required for assistance, I replace the indicator instrument in Table 2 with the number of relatives. The 2SLS result is presented in Panel (b) of Table 3 . The …t seems to marginally improve, but the main message of Table 2 does not change. Panel (c) of Table 3 presents the LIML result from replacing the two indicator instruments in Panel (a) of the table with the corresponding count instruments. Again, the main message does not change, but the second instrument is now statistically insigni…-cant.
Robustness checks
The main message seems that my excluded instruments are not su¢ ciently strongly correlated with the cross-wave change in the net interhousehold transfer. As a result, the impact of the net transfer on the household expenditure on child education is imprecisely estimated. It is consistently negative, but the statistical signi…cance remains ambiguous. This is in a way expected because my instruments do not capture unobservable timevariant heterogeneity across drought-hit communes, as well as across households within each a¤ected commune.
32
I follow Angrist and Krueger (2001: 79-80) and have looked at the estimated coef…cients on my instruments after the OLS regression of the reduced form. I …nd both 32 Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to know about recipients'households'characteristics. existence and number of relatives in drought-hit areas for households located outside the a¤ected areas are signi…cantly negative (the former at less than 5% and the latter at less than 1%). However, neither existence nor number of relatives outside drought-hit areas for households located in the a¤ected areas is statistically signi…cant. This suggests that we should focus on the results from the just identi…ed speci…cations in Tables 2 and 3(b) . The impact of the net interhousehold transfer is thus negative even though the partial correlation between these two instruments and the cross-wave change in the net transfer is not su¢ ciently strong.
By looking at the estimated marginal e¤ect of the net interhousehold transfer in Tables 2 and 3 (b), we notice that the magnitude of the estimates is nonsensically large. They suggest that an increase in the net transfer by one million dong (which is less than the average increase among households with increased net transfers) reduces household expenditures on the child's education by more than 100 percent! In order to obtain a more sensible magnitude, I follow Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) to compute a reduced form-based heteroskedasticity-robust correct-coverage con…dence interval for the marginal e¤ect of the net transfer.
33 I obtain approximately minus .34 as the upper bound of the 95% con…dence interval and minus .10 as that of the 99% con…dence interval for Table  3(b) . 34 This suggests that the impact of the net interhousehold transfer is to reduce household expenditures on child education by at least 10 percent with 99% con…dence and 34 percent with 95% con…dence. The size of the impact thus seems economically signi…cant.
Conclusion
This study has o¤ered a …rst step to understand the impact of interhousehold transfers on the members of the sender household. The empirical analysis shows that an increase in the net interhousehold transfer reduces the total household expenditure on the education of each child. This …nding suggests that interhousehold transfers might have adverse e¤ects on the members of the sending households, and calls for further studies of the relationships between private transfers and outcome variables in sender households. If interhousehold transfers decrease the sender household's human capital investment in each child, the child's future economic and social prospects are constrained. This could hurt not only the child in question but potentially also the next generation that he or she will parent. Furthermore, potential gains to the recipients of the interhousehold transfer may well be outweighed by potential losses to the senders. For example, when the current recipients reciprocate …nancial assistance in response to the adversity facing to the current senders in the future, children in the latter households could already be fully working adults. They probably miss out educational opportunities due to outgoing interhousehold transfers that take place when they are children. A policy implication from this study is that public transfers might not be so bad even if they partially crowd out private transfers. We should look at the crowding-out not just in terms of the amount of money transferred. We should consider other costs and bene…ts of private and public transfers to all parties involved in both short and long runs. If public transfers can redistribute income like private transfers do but without adverse e¤ects associated with private transfers, then there seems to be an argument for introducing public transfers even though administratively inexpensive informal transfers between extended families and socially connected households are subsequently crowded out. I do not suggest that public transfers are superior to private transfers, but I argue that our knowledge about the e¤ects of private transfers on the senders is currently limited. Without …lling this gap in the literature on private transfers, the overall welfare impact of introducing public transfers remains ambiguous. Hence this study has o¤ered a …rst step to understand what happens to the senders of private transfers. (4)- (6) By substitution of (3) into (1) and (2), and then (2) into (1), we obtain (4) where (4) and (5) into (3), we obtain (6) where 
B. Proof of Lemma 1
First of all, note that q r = Y ỹ p where Y = y p + y r is the total income available to the two households.
Using (10) and (11), let
Then, the Jacobian determinant is Sources: VLSS 1992 VLSS -1993 VLSS & 1997 VLSS -1998 Notes: Dummy variables are indicated by *. Cross-wave changes are indicated by ∆, first-wave levels by W1, and second-wave levels by W2. All monetary figures are adjusted to both temporal and spatial price level differences and are expressed at the January 1993 national average price level. GNI per capita was VN$2,268,708 in 1993 when US$1 ≈ VN$10,641, according to the World Bank (http://databank.worldbank.org).
The dependent variable refers to the 12-month period prior to the interview. So does the amount of net interhousehold transfers. The cross-wave change in the dwelling value is not provided due to many missing observations in the second wave. Durable goods refer to those purchased more than 12 months ago, and the value of each goods is the price that the owner thought could be charged in the market at the time of interview. "Seriously ill" indicates the person was so ill that her/his anthropometric information could not be collected when the surveyor visited the household. The areas affected by the 12/97-06/98 drought are rural communes of Uplands, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, and Central Highlands. To deal with a small number (5% of the estimation sample) of children for whose education ∆(Ed spending) was zero, 1 dong was added to all observations before taking log. VLSS 1992 VLSS -1993 VLSS & 1997 VLSS -1998 Notes: Dummy variables are indicated by *. The dependent variable refers to the 12-month period prior to the interview. So does the amount of the net interhousehold transfer. All monetary figures are adjusted to both temporal and spatial price level differences and are expressed at the January 1993 national average price level. "Seriously ill" indicates the person was so ill that her/his anthropometric information could not be collected when the surveyor visited the household. The areas affected by the drought are rural communes of Uplands, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, and Central Highlands. The instruments are relevant only for Wave 2, as # Relatives in the affected areas refers to information collected during the second wave interview. 
